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Abstract 
This paper investigates the behavioural implications of penalty designs on market performance using 
an experimental method. Three penalty types and two penalty levels are enforced in a laboratory 
permit  market  with  auctioning,  including  the  Australian  Carbon  Pollution  Reduction  Scheme 
proposed design of tying the penalty rate to the auction price. Compliance strategies are limited to 
undertaking irreversible abatement investment decisions or buying permits. We aim to assess how 
penalty design under the presence of subjects‟ risk preferences might affect compliance incentives, 
permit price discovery, and efficiency.  In contrast to theory, we find that penalty levels serve as a 
focal  point  that  indicates  compliance  costs  and  affects  compliance  strategies.  The  make-good 
provision penalty provides stronger compliance incentives than the other penalty types. However, the 
theory holds with regard to permit price discovery, as we find no evidence of the effect of penalty 
design on auction price. Interestingly, risk preference does not directly affect compliance decision, but 
it does influence price discovery, which evidently is a significant factor in compliance decisions as 
well as efficiency. Most importantly, a trade-off between investment incentives and efficiency is 
observed. 
Keywords: emissions trading, penalty design, experiment, auction, irreversible investment, abatement, 
compliance 
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1. Introduction 
In order to achieve its environmental effectiveness, an emissions trading scheme requires a penalty 
that encourages compliance in the permit market. In spite of the wide recognition of its importance, 
the task of evaluating the efficacy of penalty design using empirical data is almost insurmountable due 
to differences in design features of the trading schemes as well as related market structures. Therefore, 
the use of a laboratory experiment offers an advantage in controlling for these design features and 
market parameters, which enables the isolation of the variables of interest. 
This essay employs an experimental method to investigate the behavioural implications of penalty 
design on subjects‟ compliance decisions and is based on a theoretical model contained in Restiani 
and Betz (2010). In particular, we aim to assess how a specific penalty design in terms of penalty 
levels and penalty types in an auctioned permit market might induce different compliance incentives 
as well as market performance under the presence of subjects‟ risk preferences. We consider the fixed 
penalty rate, the make-good provision, and the mixed penalty design as penalty types as well as low 
and high penalty levels for the first two penalty types. As a test-bed of a proposed policy design in the 
Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, the third penalty type includes a novel trait of tying 
the  penalty  rate  to  the  auction  price.  To  isolate  the  effects  of  penalty  design,  we  abstract  from 
exogenous uncertainties, such as shocks in the emissions levels and changes in product prices, in the 
experiment.  Furthermore,  a  two-period  model  is  employed  to  highlight  the  effect  of  irreversible 
investment decisions as a compliance strategy other than permit buying. The evaluation of market 
performance is carried out by assessing price discovery in the permit market, the efficient investment 
level, compliance rates, and static efficiency. 
The sections in this paper are organised as follows. The second section conducts a literature review of 
penalty design in emissions trading schemes in practice, theory, and related experiments. This section 
also  explains  the  motivation  and  the  contribution  of  the  study.  Section  three  describes  the 
experimental design, which is followed by the presentation of the experiment‟s hypotheses in section 
four.  The following section, section five, displays results as shown by statistical summaries and the 
convergence path of some variables. Section six tests whether the results are statistically different 
from the equilibrium and further tests the hypotheses. Following results of the hypothesis testing, 
regression models are performed to control for other potentially influential variables in section seven. 
Section eight discusses the findings, and the last section concludes. 
A penalty design that ensures the compliance of market participants is one of the key market design 
elements  that  enables  an  emissions  trading  scheme  to  deliver  environmental  effectiveness  and   24-Jun-11    6 
economic efficiency. When a firm does not have the number of permits required for the levels of 
greenhouse gases it has reported, it will need to pay the penalty and/or „make good‟ on its permit 
shortfall. From an economic perspective, it is interesting to see how firms choose to comply with 
regulations in a particular setting to maximise their profits.  
Generally, three types of penalties are widely used in existing emissions trading schemes. The first is 
the fixed penalty rate (FPR) system, which sets a constant fine for each missing permit. For example, 
the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme and the Los Angeles Regional Clean Air 
Incentives Market (LA Reclaim) for NOx and SOx pollutants use this type. The second penalty type is 
the  make-good  provision  (MGP),  which  requires  firms  to  make  up  for  their  permit  shortfalls 
according to a particular ratio. Under this system, firms do not have a direct financial penalty to pay. 
Examples of this system include the US Ozone Transport Commission NOx Budget Trading Program, 
which imposes a 3:1 ratio. The last penalty type combines the two types (mixed penalty). This is the 
most  widely  used  penalty  design,  which  serves  as  a  double  penalty  to  ensure  that  the  relevant 
environmental goals are attained. This approach has been used in the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and some US emissions trading schemes.  These practices are intended to 
prevent  the  continuous  carrying-over  of  permit  shortfalls,  which  in  the  end  might  undermine  a 
scheme‟s reduction targets in the long term. 
An important question with regard to penalty design is its effectiveness. A penalty is designed such 
that firms will choose to comply because the cost of being compliant is lower than the cost of not 
complying. Thus, a firm will prefer to buy enough permits to cover its emissions and avoid a penalty. 
Unfortunately, the equilibrium permit price, as a benchmark for penalty levels, is normally unknown 
to both the regulator and the firm. As the distance between the permit price and the penalty level 
decreases, the marginal benefit of being non-compliant increases. Thus, the question emerges of what 
the penalty level should be in the beginning, when the regulator does not have much information 
about the equilibrium permit price.  
When  compliance  rates  are  used  to  measure  the  effectiveness  of  a  penalty  design,  the  existing 
schemes prove to have very high compliance rates. As permit prices can be quite volatile, the distance 
between  penalty  levels  and  permit  prices  varies  accordingly.  The  Australian  Carbon  Pollution 
Reduction Scheme (CPRS) proposal links the penalty level to auction prices in an attempt to ensure 
that the penalty level would remain slightly above the expected permit price.  
2. Literature Review 
There have been many theoretical studies of enforcement in the context of pollution control. Among 
others, Malik (1990) employs a stylised enforcement model that focuses on audit probability and the   24-Jun-11    7 
magnitude  of  the  penalty.  By  allowing  for  non-compliance  rather  than  seeking  an  optimal 
enforcement scheme, the model shows that non-compliance will alter the equilibrium permit price and 
market efficiency. Only a few studies discuss penalty types with regard to emissions trading schemes. 
Nentjes and Klaasen (2004) discuss the compliance incentives under the Kyoto Protocol but they look 
at  the  emissions  trading  scheme  as  an  implicit compliance incentive  rather than  focusing  on  the 
penalty design within the trading scheme itself. It is argued that in cases in which a seller‟s reputation 
costs are lower than that of buyers and in which seller liability applies
1, the provision to trade will 
induce  overselling  on  the  seller‟s  part,  resulting  in  a  lower  compliance  rate.  Nevertheless,  this 
conclusion is only valid when no further penalty is enforced in response to seller non-compliance. 
Furthermore, this condition is not fulfilled in the existing trading schemes, because penalty costs are 
the same for all firms and reputational costs constitute an additional penalty. Additional penalty costs 
also exist due to different penalties for reporting violations in each Member State of the EU ETS. A 
study by CPB (2003) discusses the restoration rate or the make-good ratio as a means to induce early 
action  rather  than  delaying  in  investment.  A  general  equilibrium  model  is  used  to  analyse  the 
appropriate restoration rate under some particular scenarios and the degree of delay in six blocks of 
countries. The study suggests that the interpretation of the results is highly dependent on the particular 
setting of the model. 
Trading schemes can have very different design elements, cover different industries, and operate in 
different market structures that are not directly comparable to one another. Thus, it is very difficult to 
assess  the  effectiveness  of  a  particular  penalty  design  empirically  using  field  data.  Experimental 
economics  offers  an  approach  in  which  subjects‟  decision-making  can  be  observed  while  the 
parameters and environment in which a market operates are controlled within the laboratory. To our 
knowledge, there have been a limited number of experimental studies focusing on enforcement in the 
context of emissions trading schemes. Cason and Gangadharan (2006) use a dynamic enforcement 
model to assess the interactions among banking, uncertainty regarding emissions, and compliance. In 
the  experiment,  subjects  were  required  to  self-report  their  emissions  level.  The  penalty  design 
involves a higher audit probability and a fine for subjects found to falsely report their emissions 
levels.  Their  results  show  that  a  banking  provision  induces  higher  non-compliance.  Murphy  and 
Stranlund‟s  study  (2007)  investigates  the  effects  of  targeted  enforcement  by  differing  marginal 
penalties, in terms of audit probabilities and penalty levels, for different characteristics of firms. They 
confirm the results of Stranlund and Dhanda‟s (1999) theoretical model that targeted enforcement 
does not increase the effectiveness of the enforcement scheme, although firms that are expected to be 
net buyers show a higher level of non-compliance than those that are expected to be net sellers.  
                                                           
1 The seller’s liability rule states that a sanction will be imposed on permit sellers that have oversold their 
permits without making sufficient emissions reductions.   24-Jun-11    8 
There are a couple of experiments in tradable green certificates that also study the effects of penalty 
levels. Schaeffer and Sonnemans (2000) examine compliance incentives for mandatory and voluntary 
market participants under the provision of permit banking and/or borrowing, while Ivanova (2007) 
looks at the price effect of penalty levels in an oligopolistic market. Both studies conclude that penalty 
levels affect compliance rate and price levels. Nevertheless, incomplete design of treatment variables, 
non-balanced sessions for each treatment, and the absence of control on voluntary and mandatory 
demand of permits in  Schaeffer and Sonnemans (2000) might all induce confounding effects on their 
findings. On the other hand, the oligopolistic setting in Ivanova (2007) does not suit our interest, as 
we  investigate a competitive permit market. Furthermore, the specific roles of buyers and sellers are 
not assigned to the subjects in our experiment, in contrast to Schaffer and Sonnemans‟ and Ivanonva‟s 
respective experiments.  
The existing literature seems to focus more on different audit probabilities and marginal penalties, 
targeted enforcement, and cheating as the main elements of enforcement in an emissions trading 
scheme.  Employing a rather different perspective on the enforcement model, our study focuses on the 
types and levels of penalties given perfect monitoring. Hence, we do not consider the effect of audit 
probability. It is plausible that different penalty designs might, per se, have different effects on firms‟ 
behaviour, especially under the presence of uncertainties regarding permit price and risk aversion. In 
particular, our study aims to contribute to the literature by investigating the following aspects: 
1)  The effect of penalty levels  
Since emissions trading schemes are newly created markets, penalty levels provide information 
about the maximum compliance costs, which will facilitate price discovery in the markets. From 
this perspective, the penalty level can also be seen as an indication of a price cap, although it does 
not have binding force when the cap level is triggered. Some have argued that the presence of 
non-binding  price  controls,  which  are  price  ceilings  (or  floors)  set  above  (or  below)  the 
equilibrium  price, can be useful in lowering  the costs  of  uncertainty  and thus  increasing  the 
efficiency of emissions trading markets (Jacoby and Ellerman, 2004, Burtraw et al., 2010, Fell 
and  Morgenstern,  2009,  Szolgayova  et  al.,  2008).  An  experiment  by  Isaac  and  Plott  (1981) 
studying non-binding price controls indicates that price controls do not serve as a signalling price 
or a focal point. However, the study does not find conclusive evidence that price ceilings (or price 
floors) will bias prices below (or above) the competitive equilibrium.  In contrast, Smith and 
Williams‟s  (1981)  experiment  with  a  double  auction  market  reveals  that  non-binding  price 
controls  affect  price  convergence.  As  mentioned  previously,  experiments  in  tradable  green 
certificates find that  a  higher penalty  level, combined  with  banking  provision  (Schaeffer  and 
Sonnemans, 2000) or under the presence of market power (Ivanova, 2007), raises permit price.   24-Jun-11    9 
Thus, the level of the penalty may influence the price discovery process in the market because it 
may steer the direction of prices. 
2)  The effect of penalty types  
The penalty type itself may have different effects on a firm‟s behaviour. To our knowledge, no 
experiments have been done to test the effect of penalty type. Experiments focusing on emissions 
trading schemes that have used enforcement models have only employed fixed penalty rates. 
Given that the make-good provision (MGP) can be seen as a quantity penalty that allows non-
compliant firms to „borrow‟ from future permits, the cost of compliance under the MGP is reliant 
on future permit prices. Thus greater uncertainty about future permit prices will put more pressure 
on the cost of borrowing as well as uncertainty regarding marginal penalty rates. In contrast, a 
fixed penalty rate implies a fixed per unit cost of violation (fixed marginal penalty rate). Hence, 
the  different  nature  of  the  two  penalty  types  might  affect  firms  differently  in  choosing  their 
compliance strategies. 
3)  We abstract from any uncertainties other than those which arises from subjects‟ decisions.  
Our focus is on the effects of penalty design on the performance of an emissions trading market. 
To isolate the effects of the treatment variable, we do not introduce any form of uncertainties in 
the  experiment.  The  only  uncertainties  that  might  arise  are  those  that  stem  from  subjects‟ 
decisions during the experiment. Hence, it allows us to isolate the effects of penalty types and 
levels on compliance rates and compliance strategies. 
We  simplify  the  spectrum  of  a  firm‟s  compliance  strategies  to  two  options:  irreversible 
investment decisions and permit holdings. Investment decisions are modelled as irreversible in 
order to parallel with real-world conditions in which once the investment is made, e.g. installing a 
more  efficient  turbine,  the  decision  cannot  be  reversed  and  the  scrap  value  of  the  installed 
abatement equipment is insignificant.  
4)  The mixed penalty design, which ties the penalty rate to the auction price. 
The proposed Australian model uses a mixed penalty design in which the penalty level is set very 
close to the auction price, and the make-good factor is one. This design may encourage strategic 
bidding with regard to the auction price intended to drive down firms‟ compliance costs. Given its 
policy relevance, we also consider this penalty design in our experiment.  
To sum up, this experiment aims to investigate the effect of penalty design on compliance incentives 
and market performance. In order to evaluate the effects of penalty design on market performance, we 
analyse  permit  prices  and  standard  deviation  of  prices,  the  incentives  of  each  penalty  design  on   24-Jun-11    10 
investment levels and compliance rates, and lastly how the penalty design affects efficiency. The 
details  of  the  experimental  design  and  the  hypotheses  upon  which  the  evaluation  is  based  are 
elaborated in the following sections. 
3. Experimental Design  
We consider five treatments with the type and level of penalty as our treatment variables. For each 
penalty type – the fixed penalty rate (FPR) and the make-good provision (MGP) –, we consider a low 
and a high penalty level. Additionally, we study a mixed penalty that combines the FPR and MGP 
mechanisms. For this mixed penalty, a low MGP ratio is used, and the penalty rate is linked to the 
auction price, as in the Australian model. 
Table 1 Treatments for the Penalty Design Experiment 
Penalty Design 
Penalty levels 
Low  High Level 
Fixed penalty rate (FPR) 
1.2 x equilibrium permit price 
Treatment I (AFL) 
3 x equilibrium permit price 




Treatment III (AML) 
1:3 ratio 
Treatment IV (AMH) 
Mixed penalty 
MGP low level + FPR (1.2 x auction price) 
Treatment V (AFM) 
 
The experiment procedure consists of three sessions, each of which involves two groups of eight 
subjects. The groups remain the same for the whole session. Thus, we have six observation groups for 
each treatment. The subjects are randomly allocated to a group so that they do not know whether the 
people next to them belong to the same group.  In each session, the subjects participate in Holt and 
Laury‟s (2002) lottery-choice game before taking part in the emissions trading game
2. However, the 
payoff from the Holt and Laury‟s experiment is only determined after the emissions trading game is 
concluded to avoid any endowment effects.  
The subjects are undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of New South Wales who 
were recruited through the ORSEE online recruitment system (Greiner, 2002). Each subject could 
                                                           
2 The Holt and Laury’s (2002) experiment asked subjects to choose 10 paired lottery choices A and B for which 
the probability of a higher payoff from both choices was increased. A consistent risk preference attitude will 
require a change from the safer lottery A to lottery B somewhere within the 10 pairs. The combinations of safe 
and risky choices constitute an index from 1 to 9 in which a higher number represents greater risk aversion.   24-Jun-11    11 
only participate in one session as this experiment featured a between-subject design. Thus, a total of 
240 students participated in the experiment. Each session lasted for 2.5-3 hours, and subjects earned 
an average of $24.48 for the emissions trading game and $34.20 for the whole session.  
The  emissions  trading  game  was  programmed  using  the  University  of  Zurich‟s  Z-Tree  program 
(Fischbacher, 1999). Eight subjects in one group played six repeated rounds, and each round was 
comprised of 2 sub-periods. Although we use terms related to the emissions trading scheme context in 
this essay, the subjects received instructions worded using neutral terminology. Emissions or other 
environmental terminology was not used at all in the instructions (Appendix).  
The subjects were told that they were firms that needed a license for each unit of good X that they 
produced. Firms‟ production levels before taking abatement measures represented their emissions 
levels. Permits expired at the end of each sub-period. If a firm did not hold enough permits, it would 
incur a penalty. The regulator would determine the emissions cap, which was set at 50% of firms‟ 
initial  emissions  levels,  and  this  cap  remained  the  same  for  both  sub-periods.  Firms  had  two 
compliance strategies from which they might choose: 1) making investment decision in abatement 
technology, and 2) holding enough permits to cover their emissions levels. Firms were allowed to 
undertake both measures although each firm‟s optimal compliance strategy was only either one of 
them.  
The key features of the emissions trading game are as follows: 
1.  Stages of the game 
There are four stages in the emissions trading game, as shown in Figure 1. 
 














Round  1  Round 2  Round 6 
… 
Auction of permits 
 




  Auction of permits 
 
Permit trading  
 
Compliance check 
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a)  Stage 1: Auction of permits 
The initial allocation of permits to firms is conducted through an auction using an ascending 
clock auction
3. The auction supply is fixed at 8 0 permits in each  sub-period. At this stage, 
each firm needs to submit a non-negative bidding quantity during each bidding round. As the 
bidding rounds continue, firms are given the information about the gap between the aggregate 
demand and supply. This information may lead firms to collaborate to drive down the auction 
price  (Klemperer, 2002). Nevertheless, this is highly unlikely considering the number of 
subjects and the random matching of those subjects in each session.  
The bidding price starts at Experimental Dollar (EX$) 18 and increases in EX$5 increments. 
We start with a bidding price lower than the lowest firm‟s marginal abatement cost to allow 
all firms to submit a positive bidding quantity. We choose these price parameters so that we 
will have enough bidding rounds to allow for a better price discovery process but still keep 
the auction stage from becoming too long and the experiment from taking too much time. 
When the aggregate demand of permits equals the aggregate supply, then the last bidding 
price becomes the auction price and firms are allocated permits as many as their last bidding 
quantity. If the aggregate demand for permits is less than the supply in a bidding round, then 
the auction price is the price in the penultimate bidding round, and firms are allocated their 
last  bidding  quantity  plus  any  remaining  excess  supply.  The  excess  supply  is  allocated 
according to the order of the fastest bidders. In this fashion, we follow the Virginia NOx 
auction model, which gives bidders incentives to submit their bids promptly (Holt et al., 2007, 
Porter et al., 2009). 
The clock auction format is used due to its simplicity and transparency. This dynamic auction 
type, which includes multiple bidding rounds, allows subjects to think carefully in submitting 
their bids as bidding price increases (Compte and Jehiel, 2007). An ascending auction is also 
likely to allocate the goods to bidders with the highest value because they can always rebid 
and  top  lower-value  bidders  who  may  have  bid  aggressively  in  earlier  bidding  rounds 
(Klemperer, 2002). 
b)  Stage 2: Permit trading 
                                                           
3 In an ascending clock auction, the price is  increased with each tick of  the clock, and the bidding price 
increases as long as the aggregate bidding quantity (aggregate demand) is higher than the total supply.   24-Jun-11    13 
After receiving their permit allocation at the auction, firms trade permits using a posted-offer 
continuous double auction mechanism for one minute
4. This mechanism allows firms to either 
buy or sell. Firms a re free to accept any submitted (buy or sell) public offers at any time 
during the trading stage, although improved bidding rules are used to encourage faster 
convergence of offer prices
5. Trade can only take place for each unit of license at a time. This 
double auction mechanism is a widely used trading institution in economic experiments and 
has proven to be highly efficient (Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore, 1994). Following each trade, 
firms receive updated public information regarding standing offers and trading prices as well 
as private information about their money and permit holdings. At the end of the trading stage, 
the average trading price from that  sub-period is revealed to firms as a point estimate of the 
current price. 
c)  Stage 3: Investment decision (only for sub-period one) 
The investment decision can be seen as a way to activate firm‟s abatement technology; hence, 
the investment cost is represented as the marginal abatement cost rather than as a lump sum 
capital  cost.  The  decision  to  invest  in  abatement  technology  will  ensure  that  the  firm  is 
compliant for both sub-periods in a round. To reflect the irreversibility of investments, we 
only allow firms to make investment decisions in the first sub-period; they cannot be changed 
in the second sub-period. During this stage, firms also find out whether they have an excess or 
shortfall  of  permits  before  they  make  investment  decisions.  Partial  investments  are  not 
allowed. This is meant to encourage firms to learn about their best compliance strategies. If 
firms are short permits and decide to invest, they will be over-compliant, because investment 
automatically guarantees compliance and firms can no longer sell their permits at that stage in 
a sub-period.  
d)  Stage 4: Compliance check 
The compliance check is the last stage in each sub-period where subjects learn about their 
earnings for that sub-period, their compliance status, and the penalties imposed on them if 
they are non-compliant. 
2.  Players‟ characteristics:  
                                                           
4 We allow a relatively short trading period for the spot markets as the main permit allocation process should 
have taken place at the auction. Consequently, permit trading serves as a secondary trading institution used to 
‘clean up’ the results of the auction if it does not yield the expected allocative efficiency.  
5 Improved bidding rules require that the buy offer be higher than the current  highest-standing buy offer, 
whereas the sell offer should be less than the lowest-standing sell offer.   24-Jun-11    14 
All firms produce a homogenous product and have the same production level of 20 units in each 
sub-period throughout the experiment. Firms are only differentiated by their constant marginal 
abatement cost (MAC), which is one of these values:   . 55   , 50   , 45   , 40   , 35   , 30   , 25   , 20   $ EX ci   The 
MAC is randomly allocated to each firm in each round and the set of MACs remains the same in 
all rounds. Based on the magnitude of a firm‟s marginal abatement costs, there are two types of 
firms: low-cost firms with MACs of EX$ 20-35 and high-cost firms with MACs of EX$ 40-55.  
At the beginning of each sub-period, firms receive the same total revenue of EX$2800 from their 
production activity as the price of the good is exogenous and the same for everyone. Thus, the 
marginal revenue is constant at EX$140, but firms have different marginal benefits of each unit of 
good.  
3.  Information structure 
At the beginning of sub-period one in a round, subjects receive common information about their 
initial emissions level, the emissions cap, and the penalty design.  This common information is 
known to all firms and remains the same during all rounds. At this stage, the subjects also receive 
private information about their marginal abatement costs, available money, and required number 
of licenses. In sub-period two, subjects are also reminded of their investment decisions and their 
compliance status in sub-period one. The information structure basically enables participants to 
estimate  optimal  decisions  whether  to  invest  in  abatement  technology  or  buy  permits  in  the 
market. Subjects can even calculate where the equilibrium price should be under the assumption 
of risk neutrality. Nevertheless, different risk attitudes and different expectations regarding prices 
may create uncertainty in permit price. 
4.  Banking and borrowing are not allowed. 
Because the focus of our experiment is on the penalty design, we simplify our two-period model 
to abstract from the effect of banking. By allowing neither banking nor borrowing, we attempt to 
keep the market structure the same for both sub-periods; banking might create upward pressure on 
the expected permit price in the first sub-period and will add more noise to the results. Hence the 
expected permit price should remain the same across the two sub-periods in one round.   
5.  Penalty  
The enforcement of the penalty design in the emissions trading game is conducted as follows: 
a)  In  the  FPR  treatment,  the  penalty  is  imposed  at  the  end  of  each  sub-period  during  the 
compliance check. If a firm is non-compliant, the penalty costs are deducted from that firm‟s   24-Jun-11    15 
earnings. The penalty rate is EX$ 45 for the low level FPR and EX$ 114 for the high level 
FPR. 
b)  In the MGP treatments, the penalty is enforced differently for the two sub-periods. 
i)  Non-compliance in sub-period one has no financial penalty but the violating firms need 
to surrender the quantity of the missing permits by a ratio. For example, in the high level 
MGP treatment using a ratio of 3:1, if a firm is two permits short, then it must hold six 
additional permits in sub-period two. 
ii)  As firms cannot further compensate (“make good”) for non-compliance at the end of sub-
period  two,  we  attempt  to  deter  non-compliance  by  imposing  an  enormous  financial 
penalty which is equivalent to the firm‟s total revenue (EX$ 2800).   
6.  Payoff  
Firms can maximise their payoff by minimising their compliance costs or by maximising their 
profits from selling permits during the trading stage. The payoff function is the same for all firms.  
Payoff =  
+   total revenue 
+   cash balance in sub-period one of the same round 
–   number of licenses bought in auction x auction price  
–   investment costs  
–    trading price of licenses bought during trading stage 
+  trading price of licenses sold during trading stage 
–   penalty costs 
This payoff is accumulated for all rounds, and subjects‟ earnings are shown at the end of each 
round. Nevertheless, the amount of money that subjects receive in the beginning of each round 
(sub-period one) is always equal to the total revenue. This helps us to avoid the issue of wealth 
effects for the subjects as the round goes on. 
4. Hypotheses 
In  the  competitive  equilibrium,  the  permit  price  should  lie  between  EX$35-40  under  perfect 
compliance. Considering the design of the auction bidding price, the auction price should reach its 
equilibrium at a price of EX$38. At this equilibrium, the best compliance strategy for low-cost firms   24-Jun-11    16 
is  an  investment  decision,  while  the  high-cost  firms  should  comply  by  buying  permits.  The 
equilibrium permit price is achieved when each firm chooses its best compliance strategy. 
The findings from our theoretical models (Restiani and Betz, 2010) indicate that firms will find it 
optimal  to  comply  as  long  as  the  penalty  rate  is  set  higher  than  the  equilibrium  permit  price 
(Proposition 1) or as long as the make-good ratio (restoration rate) is higher than or equal to one when 
permit prices remain the same in both sub-periods (Corollary 3). The mixed penalty design, which 
uses both types of penalties, supports those findings, and the presence of the double penalty ensures 
that  firm  compliance  is  still  achieved.  For  this  penalty  regime,  the  comparative  static  analysis 
indicates that, although the level of one penalty type is varied, compliance is still maintained due to 
the presence of the other penalty type (Proposition 7). 
Based on those findings and the parameters of the experimental design, we derive the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1:  The auction price should remain the same in all treatments because the supply and 
demand structure remains the same.  
Based on the Law of One Price, it is expected that the auction price will be the same as the trading 
price.  
Hypothesis 2:  In the FPR treatments, investment levels and compliance rates should be the same at 
100%  regardless  of  the  penalty  levels  because  the  penalty  rate  is  set  higher  than  the  theoretical 
equilibrium permit price.  
Hypothesis 3:  The make-good ratio should not affect investment levels or compliance rates in the 
MGP treatments as long as it is set equal to or higher than one under the assumption that prices 
remain the same in the two sub-periods. 
Hypothesis 4:  At the high penalty level, the compliance rates and investment levels in the FPR 
treatments should be the same as those in the MGP treatments. At the low penalty level, similar 
results are expected, although the penalty level is slightly higher in the low level FPR treatment (with 
a factor of 1.2), whereas the make-good ratio is 1. 
Hypothesis 5:  The mixed penalty treatment should yield the same compliance rates as the FPR and 
MGP treatments.    24-Jun-11    17 
5. Results 
5.1.  Subject Risk Preferences 
The Holt & Laury (2002) lottery choice experiment shows that more than 75% of the subjects are risk 
neutral,  slightly  risk  averse,  or  risk  averse,  as  expected.  We  observe  that  some  subjects  made 
inconsistent  risk  preference  choices  by  changing  from  one  lottery  to  another  more  than  once. 
However, only about 20% (or fewer) of the subjects in each treatment showed these inconsistencies 
(Figure 2). The data on subjects‟ risk preferences are later used in the estimation models because their 
risk attitude may be an important determinant of compliance strategy and auction prices. 
 
Figure 2  Results from the Lottery Choice Experiment   24-Jun-11    18 
5.2.  Convergence Path and Statistics Summary 
This section discusses the statistics summary for the main variables of interest pertaining to prices, 
compliance  strategies,  and  efficiency.  Graphically  presenting  a  particular  variable  over  a  period 
facilitates a closer inspection of the data at the group level and illustrates the existence of a discernible 
convergence path.   
5.2.1.  Price Variables 
The results show that a high penalty level for each penalty type encourages a higher auction price 
(Figure 3). It is also clear that the auction has served as the primary market for distributing permits 
instead of the spot market (trading stage), with trade volume at less than 15% of the total number of 
permits in the market. Furthermore, the mean trading price is lower than the auction price in all 
treatments.  Correspondingly,  treatments  with  a  high  penalty  level  also  have  higher  mean  trading 
prices. The mixed penalty rate, which can be viewed as a double penalty regime, results in the highest 

























AFL AFH AML AMH AFM
Auction Price Mean Trading Price
Standard Deviation of Trading Price Average Permit Price
High penalty rate
Low penalty rate
AFL: FPR low, AFH: FPR high; AML: MGP low; AMH: MGP high; AFM: Mixed Penalty
 
Figure 3 Price Variables by Treatment 
When the standard deviation of prices is considered as a measure of strong price signals, the statistics 
in Table 2 reveal that there is a pattern across treatments that is similar to that of auction prices. High 
penalty levels in the FPR penalty treatment are related to higher standard deviations for all three 
measures of prices. However, a more ambiguous link is found in the MGP treatments: the trading 
prices in the high MGP treatment have a lower standard deviation, but both auction price and average   24-Jun-11    19 
permit price have higher standard deviations. In this sense, the FPR provides a stronger price signal 
than does the MGP penalty, while the mixed penalty performs fairly well in this regard. 
The difference between auction prices and mean trading prices may indicate that the spot market is 
used to dispose of any unwanted excess permits that a subject obtains. The resale value of the permit 
may be lower because subjects are keen to minimise the loss that they accrued by acquiring such 
excess permits at the auction. On the contrary, this can also highlight how the permit demand has been 
falsely increased at the auction, possibly due to strategic bidding behaviour rather than to a real need 
to acquire permits for compliance purpose. The data show that in 120 out of 360 observations, the 
auction price is equal to or higher than the mean trading price, which confirms that some buyers at the 
auction realise gains by trading in the spot markets.  However, most of the time those buyers make 
losses as mean trading prices tend to be lower than the average auction price. A lower price at a resale 
market is not unusual as the opportunity of having a resale market induces a common-value character 
at the auction. Hence, subjects‟ bidding quantities are not only motivated by their private valuation of 
the permit but may be biased by the speculative wish to realise some gains at the resale market or the 
secondary market (Haile, 2003, Garratt and Tröger, 2006). As a result, inefficiency occurs at the 
auction and this inefficiency is increasing in the uncertainty regarding the common-value or the resale 
value (Goeree and Offerman, 2003). 
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FPR Low (AFL)  45.01  11.59  33.63  5.36  43.66  10.72  11.75 
FPR High (AFH)  48.21  11.79  36.25  6.70  46.80  11.19  10.25 
MGP Low (AML)  42.58  21.73  35.91  15.82  41.94  20.82  6.35 
MGP High (AMH)  48.28  27.67  38.85  5.63  47.77  27.00  8.22 
Mixed Penalty (AFM)  45.57  14.09  40.85  5.23  45.30  13.97  6.81 
Optimum  38  0  35-40  0  35-40  0  0 
  Notes: 
a s.d. = standard deviation, 
b ave. = average  
The average permit price reflects the volume-weighted average based on the auction and trading price. 
As the volume traded in the secondary market is low, it is not very different from the auction price. 
The average permit price in all treatments is constantly higher than the range of prices in the efficient 
equilibrium. The average prices lie around the low level FPR and remain well below the high level 
FPR.    24-Jun-11    20 
Given the complexity of our experimental design, it is expected that a learning curve might affect 
subjects‟ decision making during the experiment. This learning effect is not directly observable from 
mean values but will be more discernable through a convergence path for permit prices over time. 
Based on the scatter plot and the fitted line of the average permit price using lowess smoothing
6 in 
Figure 4, we observe a general convergence path for permit price in all treatments, although this 
convergence pattern is stronger in the FPR and mixed penalty treatments than in the MGP treatments. 
Furthermore, an end-game effect
7 is evident in both of the MGP treatments as the price plummeted 
during the last round of the experiment. 
As shown in Figure 4(a), the permit price in the FPR low level treatment (AFL) begins above the low 
level penalty rate, (EX$45) in the first round and then rises slightly in the second round before starting 
to fall until round five, when it flattens out around the equilibrium price.  A similar trend is also 
apparent in the FPR high level treatment (AFH). Nevertheless, the starting point of the permit price in 
the first round is slightly higher than in the AFL treatment. Moreover, in the two last rounds, the price 
stabilises above the equilibrium range and just slightly below the low penalty level of EX$45. The 
range of the scatter plot is also higher for AFH than for AFL.  
In contrast, the convergence path for permit prices is markedly different for the low and high level 
MGP treatments (Figure 4 (c) and (d)). The price in the low level MGP treatment (AML) begins at a 
very high level at EX$70 in the first sub-period of the first round. Then it starts to fall and continues 
to do so until the third round. Despite some fluctuation, the price then remains near the equilibrium 
until round five. Afterwards, there is an end-game effect in the last round. On the other hand, a more 
pronounced pattern of convergence of permit price over time is observed in  the high level MGP 
treatment (AMH). The starting price in the first round is close to those of the FPR treatments at 
EX$50. Subsequently, the price remains adjacent to the low -level penalty rate at EX$45 for four 
rounds before the end-game effect takes place in the last round. The range of the scatter plot in the 
MGP treatment is much larger than that in the FPR treatments, and more outliers are observed with a 
maximum permit price of EX$193 in AMH. This is due to the penalty design in  sub-period two for 
the MGP treatments in which subjects will lose a total revenue of EX$2800, which is equal to a 
marginal penalty of EX$140 for 20 units of permits. If a subject is less than 20 units short on permits, 
the value of the marginal penalty will increase accordingly. Therefore, the permit price in sub-period 
two of the MGP treatments can rise to a very high level. 
                                                           
6 Lowess is a locally weighted regression of y (dependent variable) on x (independent variable). It is normally 
used for scatterplot smoothing and is desirable because it tends to follow the data. 
7 An end-game effect is a systematic change in behaviour that occurs as an experiment with repeated rounds 
reaches its conclusion.   24-Jun-11    21 
The Mixed Penalty treatment (AFM) shows a convergence path that is more similar to that of the FPR 
treatments than to that of the MGP treatments. In the first round, the price starts slightly higher at 
around EX$55. After that, the price continuously falls until it stabilises right around the efficient 
equilibrium in the last round. Nevertheless, the range of permit prices in this treatment is obviously 
larger than those in FPR treatments, possibly due to the effect of having MGP element in the penalty 
design. Given that the penalty rate is linked to the auction price, we expect to see strategic bidding 
behaviour drive down the auction price and hence the compliance cost. Although relatively low prices 
are observed in period ten (sub-period two of round five), these prices rise again in the next period. 
Hence, there is no clear evidence of that sort of collusion to drive down auction prices.    24-Jun-11    22 
 
Figure 4  Convergence Path of Average Permit Price over Time 
(a)  (b) 
(c)  (d) 
(e) 
Note:  
Each round consists of two sub-periods.  
Period with odd numbers represent sub-period 
one of a round, while the even numbers represent 
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5.2.2.  Compliance Strategy and Compliance Rate 
We examine the main effects of penalty design on environmental effectiveness using two variables: 
investment level and compliance rate. The variables are expressed in terms of the number of firms and 
compared to the optimal level. At the equilibrium, there should be four investing firms – and thus the 
other  four  permit  buying  firms  -  and  eight  compliant  firms,  yielding  the  optimal  scale  of  unity   













































AFL AFH AML AMH AFM
Investing Firms Compliant Firms
AFL: FPR low,  AFH: FPR high, AML: MGP low,  AMH: MGP high,  AFM: Mixed Penalty
 
Figure 5 Investment and Compliance Levels by Treatment 
As with the standard deviations of trading prices, the investment level is also higher with high level 
FPR treatments, but this is not the case with MGP treatments, which behave in the opposite manner. 
Over-investment is observed in all treatments as the mean investment level is higher than the optimal 
level. It seems plausible that a high penalty level will lead to a higher investment level because the 
mixed  penalty  design,  which  involves  double  penalties,  exhibits  the  highest  investment  level. 
Nevertheless this inference will only be valid after a regression model is performed to control for 
influencing factors. 
Interestingly, the observed over-investment is not translated into full compliance (where 100% of 
firms are compliant), although the trend in the investment level is also shown in the number of 
compliant firms. A high penalty level encourages a higher number of compliant firms in the FPR 
treatments, and the mixed penalty displays the highest compliance level.  
Logically, if over-investment is prevalent, then there will be less of a demand for permits, which will 
consequently  temper  permit  prices  and render  cheaper  compliance  costs  for  permit-buying  firms.   24-Jun-11    24 
Nevertheless,  this  is  not  observed  in  the  experiment,  as  prices  remain  high  regardless  of  over-
investment. This result highlights the inefficiency at the auction market as well as in the secondary 
market, which fail to distribute permits to subjects who require them. The fact that full compliance is 
not realised in the market, despite over-investment, also means that some investing firms still hold 
excess permits at the end of a sub-period and put buyers in a short position. Considering that the trade 
volume on the secondary market is pretty low, which imply that subjects had enough time to trade but 
only realised a few trades, this inefficiency is more likely to be attributed to the auction market. 
Nevertheless, it is plausible that permit buying firms at the auction were attempting to achieve gains 
from  arbitrage  trading,  but  mostly  were  unsuccessful.  The  competitive  nature  of  clock  auctions 
(Compte and Jehiel, 2007) can push prices to a fairly high level, which makes it more difficult for 
firms to make a profit in the spot market. 
Comparing the processes that firms use to choose the best compliance strategy in the FPR and MGP 
treatments, we conjecture that the “quantity-penalty” nature of the MGP treatments creates much 
more price uncertainty for firms and more deterrent effects, resulting in more volatility in the market. 
Over time, this volatility makes it more difficult for firms to arrive at the best compliance strategies 
because price signals are more scattered. As shown in the standard deviation statistics (Table 3), 
although the low MGP treatment and the mixed penalty provide very strong compliance incentives, 
they also make it more difficult for firms to make investment decisions, as revealed by the high 
standard deviations of the investment level figures. 

















FPR Low (AFL)  1.130  0.2481  0.810  0.1512 
FPR High (AFH)  1.215  0.2232  0.913  0.1020 
MGP Low (AML)  1.292  0.3168  0.927  0.0956 
MGP High (AMH)  1.174  0.2125  0.917  0.1168 
Mixed Penalty (AFM)  1.319  0.2560  0.941  0.0938 
Optimum  1.000  0  1.000  0 
      Notes: 
a compared to the optimal level, 
b s.d. = standard deviation 
In the theoretical equilibrium, firms with low marginal abatement costs (low MAC firms) should 
choose investment decisions as their sole compliance strategy, whereas those with high marginal 
abatement costs (high MAC firms) should not invest and should just buy permits, using this as their 
best  compliance  strategy.  However,  when  the  auction  price  is  higher  than  the  equilibrium,  firm   24-Jun-11    25 
decisions about the best compliance strategies will not be as easy as expected, especially for the high 
MAC firms. 
 
Figure 6 Compliance Rates and Investment Decisions by Firm Type 
The data confirm that across treatments, firms with low MAC have higher compliance rates than do 
high MAC firms (Figure 6). Hence, buying permits is not always perceived as the best compliance 
strategy  for  high  MAC  firms,  because  prices  fluctuate  at  a  higher  level  than  the  theoretical 
equilibrium permit price. Although the low MAC firms do not always choose investment as their best 
compliance strategy, the compliance rate for these firms is still higher than that of the high MAC 
firms. The non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test statistics verify that the differences in compliance rates 
and investment decisions by firm type are highly significant (p-value = 0.0001). For both firm types, 
the mixed penalty (AFM) provides the strongest compliance incentives. In terms of penalty type,   24-Jun-11    26 
MGP treatments also provide better compliance incentives than do FPR treatments, and yet they also 
induce stronger investment incentives for high MAC firms, which explain the incidence of over-
investment in general. 
When we consider the learning effect of compliance decisions, we note that the convergence path for 
compliance rates over time does not show a very strong effect compared to that of the average permit 
price  (Figure  7).  The  lowess  regression  curves  seem  to  have  fairly  stable  patterns,  although  the 
compliance rates vary across treatments. We have six observations for each treatment in each period, 
and fewer scatter points imply that there are some repeated values for compliance rates.  
The  low  FPR  treatment  exhibits  a  fairly  low  compliance  rate  of  75%  in  the  first  round  before 
stabilising around the 80% level in later rounds. Nevertheless, the scatter points are more dispersed in 
the low FPR, implying a higher standard deviation of compliance rates. Higher levels of compliance 
rates  are  clearly  noticeable  in  both  MGP  treatments,  in  which  they  stay  above  the  90%  level 
throughout all rounds, although more variance in the lower rates is also apparent in the high MGP 
treatment. A slightly different convergence path for compliance rates occurs with the mixed penalty 
treatment, where compliance rates begin very high at around 95% before decreasing to around 90% in 
the first half of the session and then stabilising back at the 95% level. The lowest standard deviation 
of compliance rates is achieved under the mixed penalty regime. 
   24-Jun-11    27 
 
Figure 7 Convergence Path of Compliance Rates over Time 
(a)  (b) 
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5.2.3.  Efficiency 
At  the  end  of  each  sub-period,  efficiency  is  the  variable  that  sums  up  the  measure  of  market 
performance under non-compliance. As permit prices rise, firms need to incur higher costs to buy 
permits, and hence, the efficiency of the market is compromised. In this case, static efficiency is 
measured in terms of the actual group earnings compared to the theoretical optimum. This efficiency 
measure  is  chosen  rather  than  the  usual  cost  savings  measure  to  obtain  normalised  values  for 
efficiency since higher prices will yield some negative values for efficiency in terms of cost savings. 
The  data  show  that  a  low  penalty  level  results  in  greater  efficiency  and  that  the  FPR  treatment 




















AFL AFH AML AMH AFM
AFL: FPR low,  AFH: FPR high,  AML:MGP low,  AMH: MGP high,  AFM: Mixed Penalty  
Figure 8 Efficiency by Treatment 
6.  Test of Treatment Effects 
6.1.  Test of Significant Difference to the Theoretical Equilibrium 
The statistical summaries of prices and compliance strategies illustrate how the mean values generally 
deviate from the theoretical optimal values. In spite of the observable differences, further tests are 
required to confirm that these differences are statistically significant. Therefore this section looks at 
how  the  hypotheses  are  tested  using  the  non-parametric  Wilcoxon  signed  rank  test.  This  test  is 
performed to evaluate auction prices, investment levels, and compliance rates. It should be noted that 
the  Wilcoxon  signed  rank  test  evaluates  whether  the  medians  (rather  than  the  means)  of  those 
variables are significantly different from the hypothesised values.   24-Jun-11    29 
 
Table 4 Test of Auction Price Equal to Theoretical Equilibrium 
Treatment 
p-value from Wilcoxon Sign Rank test for  
H0: Auction price= 38 




FPR Low (AFL)  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.1144 
FPR High (AFH)  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0003*** 
MGP Low (AML)  0.4452  0.1770  0.7582 
MGP High (AMH)  0.0031***  0.0065**  0.1049 
Mixed Penalty (AFM)  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.2722 
           Notes: * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level, *** significant at 0.1% level 
                      Number of observation is 72 for the whole session and 36 for half sessions. 
The Wilcoxon test statistics reveal that the medians of the auction prices are significantly different 
from the optimal level at EX$38 for all treatments except the low level MGP treatment. The chosen 
optimal value is not only a mid-value within the optimal range (EX$ 35-40) but also the theoretical 
optimal auction price given by our experimental design. 
In order to assess whether learning effect may affect the results, the data set is split into two half-
sessions (round 1-3 and round 4-6). Similar results as for the whole data set are achieved for the first 
half  of  the  session.  In  the  second  half  of  the  session,  the  significant  difference  to  the  optimal 
equilibrium  is  only  maintained  for  the  high  level  FPR  treatment.  This  result  is  in  line  with  the 
convergence path for average permit price that illustrates how the prices start to enter the equilibrium 
range in round three or round four and remain there until an end-game effect takes place in the last 
round in the case of MGP treatments. Thus, there is a general indication of learning effect over rounds 
as subjects learn to arrive at the equilibrium auction price in the second half of the session.  
The  same  test  is  also  performed  to  assess  whether  the  investment  and  compliance  rates  are 
significantly different from the optimal value of unity. Highly significant test statistics are obtained 
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Table 5 Test of Investment Level Equal to Theoretical Equilibrium 
Treatment 
p-value from Wilcoxon Sign Rank test for  
H0: normalised investment level = 1 




FPR Low (AFL)  0.0001***  0.0041**  0.0092** 
FPR High (AFH)  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
MGP Low (AML)  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
MGP High (AMH)  0.0000***  0.0003**  0.0000*** 
Mixed Penalty (AFM)  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
Notes: * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level, *** significant at 0.1% level 
                     Number of observation is 72 for the whole session and 36 for half sessions. 
Table 6 Test of Compliance Rate Equal to Theoretical Equilibrium 
Treatment 
p-value from Wilcoxon Sign Rank test for Ho: 
normalised compliance rate = 1 




FPR Low (AFL)  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
FPR High (AFH)  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0000*** 
MGP Low (AML)  0.0000***  0.0001***  0.0000*** 
MGP High (AMH)  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0002*** 
Mixed Penalty (AFM)  0.0000***  0.0000***  0.0082** 
 Notes: * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level, *** significant at 0.1% level 
            Number of observation is 72 for the whole session and 36 for half sessions. 
One major difference between those two variables is the direction of the deviation from the optimal 
equilibrium. While the medians investment levels lie above the theoretical equilibrium, the median 
compliance rates mostly stay below the optimal perfect compliance rate. 
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6.2.   Hypothesis Testing of Treatment Effects  
6.2.1.  The Effect of Penalty Design on Auction Price 
Result 1: There are no differences in auction prices across treatments (consistent with Hypothesis 1)
 8. 
Furthermore, auction prices remain above the optimal equilibrium level in earlier rounds but then 
converged to the equilibrium range in later periods. 
Support: The Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test is used to test whether all five treatments have the 
same underlying distribution in terms of auction price. Each observation group is assumed to be 
independent, and no further assumptions are made with regard to the distribution of the data. Group-
level data is collected for each round, and hence, the test is run over 360 observations. Since the test 
yields a p-value of 0.1537, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that auction prices come from the 
same underlying population distribution.  
The Kruskal-Wallis test is the analog of the ANOVA test that is based on a normal distribution. These 
tests  cannot  determine  whether  only  one  or  some  of  the  samples  exhibit  a  distribution  that  is 
significantly different from those of the rest of the samples. To answer that question, another test 
should  be  performed  using  a  pairwise  comparison.  We  employ  the  Wilcoxon  rank  sum  test 
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney  test)  and  the  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  to  inspect  the  presence  of 
treatment effects. Whereas the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test evaluates whether the medians of two 
samples represent two populations with different median values, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test looks 
at the differences between the underlying population distributions of the two samples (Sheskin, 2004). 
In most cases, consistent results are obtained from the two tests (Table 7). Whereas the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test only confirms significant difference between median auction price in the low FPR and 
the low MGP treatment, more significant test results are obtained from the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
test. Significant test statistics at the 5% level verify lower medians of auction price in the MGP than 
the FPR treatment for both penalty levels, especially in earlier rounds. The median auction price is 
also lower in the low MGP compared to the Mixed Penalty treatment. However, this lower median 
auction  price  in  the  MGP  treatment  is  achieved  through  very  volatile  markets,  as  the  standard 
deviation of auction price is the highest in the MGP treatment.  
 
 
                                                           
8 Hypothesis 1 states that the auction price should remain the same in all treatments because the supply and 
demand structure remains the same.   24-Jun-11    32 
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Penalty level in FPR  
(AFL & AFH) 
0.1213  0.419  0.4841  0.965  0.0646  0.257 
Penalty level in MGP 
(AML & AMH) 
0.1706  0.213  0.5824  0.413  0.2045  0.615 
Penalty type, low-level penalty 
(AFL & AML) 
0.0413*  0.014**  0.0634  0.257  0.2468  0.083 
Penalty type, high-level penalty 
(AFH & AMH) 
0.0530*  0.062  0.0339*  0.083  0.4889  0.257 
Mixed penalty and low FPR 
(AFM & AFL) 
0.9085  0.992  0.8157  0.825  0.7795  1.000 
Mixed penalty and low MGP 
(AFM & AML) 
0.0483*  0.062  0.0376*  0.150  0.3816  0.257 
Notes:  
a KS = Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  
          * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level, *** significant at 0.1% level 
           Number of observation is 144 for the whole session and 72 for half sessions. 
Separate tests on the half session data unveils similar inferences as the whole session data: we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of no differences in auction prices, except for the comparison of penalty 
type in the high level penalty and the comparison of the mixed penalty treatment to the low MGP 
treatment for the first half of the session. 
6.2.2.  The Effect of Penalty Level in the Fixed Penalty Rate Treatment 
Result 2: There are differences between compliance rates but not between investment levels for the 
low and high level penalty in the FPR treatment. The compliance rate is statistically higher in the 
high level penalty treatments (which is inconsistent with Hypothesis 2)
 9. 
Support: A test of treatment effects is required only for two groups of independent samples. The 
Wilcoxon  rank  sum  test  and  the  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test  are  conducted  to  assess  whether  the 
statistics from the two samples are statistically different. The test statistics (Table 8) show that there is 
no significant difference between the investment levels at the low and the high level penalty and 
consistent results are obtained from both non-parametric tests. On the contrary, the test statistics for 
the compliance rates are highly significant for the whole session and the half-sessions. 
                                                           
9 Hypothesis 2  states that in the FPR treatments, investment levels and compliance rates should be the 
same at 100% regardless of the penalty levels because the penalty rate is set higher than  the theoretical 
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p-value by half-session 
Period 1-6  
(Round 1-3) 





a  Wilcoxon 
rank-sum 
KS




Investment level  0.0658  0.419  0.3471  0.615  0.0899  0.615 
Compliance rate  0.0000***  0.001***  0.0032**  0.043*  0.0017**  0.005** 
 Notes:  
a KS = Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  
             * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level, *** significant at 0.1% level 
              Number of observation is 144 for the whole session and 72 for half sessions. 
6.2.3.  The Effect of Penalty Level in the Make-Good Provision Treatment 
Result 3: Penalty level does not significantly affect either investment levels or compliance rates in the 
MGP treatment (consistent with Hypothesis 3)
 10. 
Support: The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two 
samples come from populations with the same underlying distribution. Nevertheless, the Wilcoxon 
test results show that the median investment level is just significantly different at 5% level. The 
results from the half session‟s data confirms that the difference is only significant for earlier rounds. 
Hence, the test statistics from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov show more conservative estimates than those 
from the Wilcoxon test, and we conclude that, in general, no significant differences are found in both 
investment levels and compliance rates. 




p-value by half-session 
Period 1-6  
(Round 1-3) 





a  Wilcoxon 
rank-sum 
KS




Investment level  0.0513*  0.419  0.0400*  0.083  0.3731  0.615 
Compliance rate  0.7987  1.000  0.2051  0.965  0.3706  1.000 
 Notes:  
a KS = Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  
             * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level, *** significant at 0.1% level 
              Number of observation is 144 for the whole session and 72 for half sessions. 
                                                           
10 Hypothesis 3 states that the make-good ratio should not affect investment levels or compliance rates in the 
MGP treatments as long as it is set equal to or higher than one under the assumption that prices remain the 
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6.2.4.  The Effect of Penalty Type 
Result  4:  At  the  high  penalty  level,  different  penalty  types  do  not  provide  different  compliance 
incentives because there are no significant differences in terms of investment levels and compliance 
rates between the FPR and the MGP (which is consistent with Hypothesis 4)
 11. On the other hand, 
different compliance rates are observed at the low penalty level in which the MGP treatments have 
higher compliance rates than the FPR treatments (which is inconsistent with Hypothesis 4). However, 
the same distinction does not exist between investment levels. 
Support:  As  shown  by  Table  10,  we  obtain  consistent  test  statistics  for  the  high  level  penalty 
treatments. We do not find enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the two samples are 
derived from the same population distribution. Meanwhile, the low level penalty treatment constantly 
demonstrates  that compliance rates are  significantly  higher in the  MGP  penalty  than in the  FPR 
penalty for the whole session and the half-session data. Similar results are obtained for the median of 
investment levels, particularly in the first half-session as the subjects still learn to decide on their 
optimal compliance strategy. 




p-value by half session 
Period 1-6  
(Round 1-3) 





a  Wilcoxon 
rank-sum 
KS





Investment level  0.0070**  0.213  0.0255*  0.022*  0.0739  0.615 
Compliance rate  0.0000***  0.000***  0.0000***  0.002**  0.0041**  0.043* 
High-level penalty 
Investment level  0.3116  1.000  0.4039  0.615  0.5217  0.615 
Compliance rate  0.5571  1.000  0.9708  1.000  0.4004  0.965 
    Notes:  
a KS = Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  
                * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level, *** significant at 0.1% level 
                Number of observation is 144 for the whole session and 72 for half sessions. 
 
                                                           
11 Hypothesis 4 states that at the high penalty level, the compliance rates and investment levels in the FPR 
treatments should be the same as those in the MGP treatments. At the low penalty level, similar results are 
expected, although the penalty level is slightly higher in the low level FPR treatment (with a factor of 1.2), 
whereas the make-good ratio is 1.   24-Jun-11    35 
6.2.5.  The Effect of Double Penalty in the Mixed Penalty Design 
Result 5: The mixed penalty design provides the same investment and compliance incentives as the 
low MGP treatment. However, the same conclusion cannot be drawn when the comparison is made to 
the low FPR treatment since significant differences are found with regard to investment levels and 
compliance rates (inconsistent with  Hypothesis 5)
 12. 
Support: As the mixed penalty comprises of two penalty types with some modification, the evaluation 
of the effect of this penalty design is carried out using these elements. Hence, we assess the treatment 
effects by making a comparison with the low level MGP (AML) treatment and with the low level FPR 
(AFL) treatments. Unlike the AFL treatments, the mixed penalty design uses variable penalty rates 
over time because the penalty rate is linked to the auction price. As shown in Table 11, the test 
statistics are only significant when we draw a comparison with the AFL treatment. Once again, this 
result highlights the different compliance incentives provided by low level FPR and low level MGP. 




p-value by half session 
Period 1-6  
(Round 1-3) 














Mixed Penalty and low FPR 
Investment level  0.0001***  0.014**  0.0106**  0.083  0.0020**  0.083 
Compliance rate  0.0000***  0.000***  0.0013***  0.022*  0.0000***  0.000*** 
Mixed Penalty and low MGP 
Investment level  0.3040  0.947  0.9439  0.615  0.1499  0.965 
Compliance rate  0.2715  0.847  0.2956  0.965  0.0087**  0.083 
    Notes:  
a KS = Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  
                * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level, *** significant at 0.1% level 
                Number of observation is 144 for the whole session and 72 for half sessions. 
7.  Estimation models 
The test of the treatment effects in the previous chapter cannot fully capture the relationship between 
our treatment variables and a particular variable of interest (the dependent variable) because the test 
procedure  only  takes  into  account  the  variation  in  one  particular  variable  without  holding  other 
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variables constant. Moreover, the subjects‟ characteristics might have some influence. In order to 
control for all of those factors and to isolate the treatment effects, we ran regression models to further 
examine the effects of our treatment variables on auction price, investment decisions, firm compliance 
through permit-buying, and efficiency.  
Auction price is chosen as the first dependent variable, because it is the first price signal that subjects 
receive before deciding on their compliance strategy through investment decisions and permit-buying 
in  the  spot  market.  Subsequently,  investment  decisions  and  firm  compliance  status  of  the  non-
investing firms (permit-buying firms) are also important dependent variables that represent the two 
available compliance strategies. Hence, regressions are performed on those dependent variables so 
that  the  treatment  effects  of  penalty  type  and  penalty  level  can  be  carefully  verified.  Finally, 
efficiency is a crucial measure of market performance, as it is a major criterion of the economic 
success of an emissions trading scheme.  
7.1.  Auction Price  
Considering that the auction is the first stage in each sub-period in the emissions trading game, we can 
only include treatment variables and subjects‟ characteristics in each observation group as dependent 
variables. The estimation is performed using group-level data collected in each sub-period with a total 
of 360 observations. The regression model for auction price is estimated using a robust panel data 
random-effects model. 
Model 1 represents the basic model that contains the treatment variables for penalty design as the 
main regressors, i.e. a dummy for the FPR treatment, a dummy for the high-level FPR treatment, a 
dummy for the MGP treatment, and a dummy for the high-level MGP treatment. In the mixed penalty 
design, the dummy for high FPR is set at zero (the low level), although the penalty rate is actually 
varied.  This measure is taken as the penalty rate is directly linked to the auction price; hence, it is not 
independent  of  the  auction  price.  Including  the  penalty  rate  as  a  regressor  would  produce  bias 
estimates toward higher significance. In view of the complexity of our experiment, round and sub-
period two are also included as regressors and used to examine subjects‟ learning curves over time.  
In Model 2, the effects of risk-related variables are taken into account. The group risk preference 
index represents the aggregated value of each subject‟s Holt & Laury‟s (2002) risk preference index 
for  each  observation  group.  We  also  employ  the  same  aggregation  approach  for  the  variable 
inconsistent risk preference choice.  
Model 3 incorporates additional control variables related to subjects‟ income variables that include 
age, household income, number of household members, and individual income. Since most of the 
students  are not  financially  independent,  we  control  for the effects  of  these  income  variables  on   24-Jun-11    37 
subjects‟ risk preferences. These demographic variables are measured in terms of the mean values of 
interval or ordinal variables. 
An additional set of demographic variables pertaining to gender and education are added to Model 4. 
These variables are the number of females in a group, study degree (e.g. undergraduate, Master‟s, or 
PhD program), a dummy for majors related to economics, number of years in school, and full-time 
enrolment  status.  At  the  individual  level,  study  program  is  a  categorical  variable  that  indicates 
whether a subject is undertaking an undergraduate, master‟s, or doctoral program. For group-level 
data, a mean value is used for each group. The same approach is used for the other demographic 
explanatory variables.   
The estimate summary (Table 12) shows that the signs of the explanatory variables are intuitive and 
consistent across all models. The coefficients of the MGP treatment are always much smaller than 
those of the FPR treatment, although neither are significantly different than zero. On the contrary, the 
coefficients of the high level MGP are about 2 to 3 times larger than those of the high level FPR. The 
coefficients for penalty design are not statistically significant except in Model 3 for the high MGP 
treatment. Thus, we can conclude that the quantity-penalty nature of the high level MGP evidently 
raises the demand for permits vis a vis other penalty designs. Significant constant terms are also 
evident across models. The summary statistics also display the values of rho and theta to represent the 
influence of group-specific effects as an inherent term in a random-effects model.  
The variable round has a negative sign, indicating that the learning curve has a negative effect on 
auction  prices.  This  implies  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  experiment,  permits  were  in  very  high 
demand, possibly due to cautious behaviour (the subjects wanted to ensure that they would achieve 
compliance) or due to the required time for subjects to learn about the equilibrium permit price. The 
coefficient of round is also statistically and economically significant. Unsurprisingly, the auction price 
is slightly lower in sub-period 2 because over-investment in sub-period 1 effectively reduces permit 
demand. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant. In terms of the goodness of fit of the 
model, the overall correlation value is relatively small, and the model performs better in explaining 
the variation between observation groups than the variation within the same group.  
Based on the risk-related variables in Model 2, we see that subjects that make inconsistent choices 
during the Holt & Laury experiment may engage in irrational bidding behaviour that increases the 
demand for permits at the auction. The magnitude of the coefficient is also economically significant 
because the presence of only one irrational subject will increase the auction price by more than EX$2. 
The  group  risk  preference  index  also  shows  the  expected  relationship:  greater  risk  aversion  is 
associated with more cautious bidding behaviour, which then results in a lower auction price – albeit   24-Jun-11    38 
not with statistical significance. According to the R
2 value, the goodness of fit is slightly greater than 
in Model 1, and the between correlation is triple enhanced. 
Table 12 Estimates Summary for Auction Price Model 




(Model 1 + 
Risk) 
Model 3 
(Model 2 + 
Income) 
Model 4 
(Model 3 + 
gender and study) 
Dummy for FPR  2.9861  4.3953  5.0095  3.4850 
  (2.6218)  (3.0792)  (3.2187)  (3.5141) 
Dummy for high level FPR   3.1944  2.3382  2.8419  3.3898 
   (3.7962)  (3.0537)  (3.6890)  (3.5971) 
Dummy for MGP  0.5556  1.1085  0.6905  3.4868 
   (3.5854)  (3.4998)  (3.5133)  (3.1911) 
Dummy for high level MGP   5.6944  6.7694  8.1732*  5.2603 
   (4.7587)  (4.2066)  (3.9863)  (3.9259) 
Round  -2.4024***  -2.4024***  -2.4024***  -2.4024*** 
   (0.6777)  (0.6796)  (0.6835)  (0.6885) 
Dummy for sub-period two  -0.3611  -0.3611  -0.3611  -0.3611 
   (1.7946)  (1.7997)  (1.8101)  (1.8232) 
Group risk preference index    -0.3280  -0.5365*  -0.6538** 
     (0.2126)  (0.2198)  (0.2501) 
Number  of subjects with     2.5873*  2.7198**  2.1594* 
   inconsistent risk choices    (1.1067)  (0.9997)  (0.9004) 
Constant  50.6167***  59.2014***  72.1731***  115.0062* 
   (4.5917)  (10.9804)  (15.9237)  (48.2215) 
Observation  360  360  360  360 
Within correlation  0.0580  0.0580  0.0580  0.0580 
Between correlation  0.0897  0.2752  0.3570  0.4581 
Overall correlation  0.0627  0.0904  0.1026  0.1177 
Chi
2  15.4591  35.8100  47.9306  104.2794 
Rho (% variance due to group-
specific effect)  0.0926  0.0716  0.0816  0.1021 
Theta
13  0.3294  0.2792  0.3044  0.3496 
 Notes:   The numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of the estimates. 
           * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level, *** significant at 0.1% level 
Although  the  estimations  in  Model  3  seem  to  explain  better  compared  to  the  other  models,  the 
constant term of the model also increases by 20%. In addition to the previously significant variables, 
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the group risk preference index and the dummy for high level MGP also become significant. The 
coefficients of the latter variables have intensified as much as the constant term. Although none of the 
additional income variables have significant test statistics, the control of those risk-related variables 
noticeably improves the model. The signs of the income variables are also as expected. Higher group 
age  and  individual  income  are  negatively  correlated  with  auction  price,  indicating  more  sensible 
bidding behaviour that drives down auction price. In contrast, higher household income and more 
household  members  contribute  to  higher  auction  prices.  Nevertheless,  these  relationships  are 
statistically not different from zero. With regard to the goodness of fit as measured using the R
2 value, 
this model yields a slightly higher overall correlation than Model 2. 
The inclusion of more demographic variables in Model 4 has slightly enhanced the overall correlation 
of the model at the expense of the escalated constant term, which is at about 60% of that in Model 3. 
As  in  the  previous  model,  neither  of  the  demographic  variables  is  statistically  significant.  The 
significant independent variables remain the same except for the dummy for the high MGP treatment.  
Overall, the regression models show that the penalty design does not significantly affect the price 
discovery process in the market with respect to auction price. The only exception is one model in 
which the high MGP treatment contributes significantly to a much higher auction price. These results 
are  essentially  in  line  with  the  test  statistics  for  treatment  effect  for  Hypothesis  1,  in  which  the 
Wilcoxon rank sum test verifies the effect of the high MGP treatment, especially in the first half of the 
session. More importantly, the risk-related variables have the largest marginal effect on auction price. 
Higher risk aversion moderates speculative bidding behaviour and drives down auction price closer to 
the equilibrium. On the contrary, subjects with irrational risk choices can inflate auction price. The 
variable round confirms the presence of learning effects because it remains statistically significant 
across models. 
7.2.  Investment Decision 
After participating at the auction, subjects can trade in the secondary market before deciding to make 
an investment in abatement technology in sub-period one. At the investment decision stage, each 
subject is given information about his or her final permit holdings for that sub-period and whether 
they hold an excess or shortfall of permits for compliance. During this stage, if firms have a shortfall 
of permits, then the only way to achieve compliance and avoid a penalty is by making an investment 
decision.  
In view of the decision process, the penalty design treatment variables, price variable, firm type, and 
firm long permit position are used to regress individual investment decisions. Unlike in the estimation 
models for auction price, the penalty rate is used rather than a dummy variable for the high FPR   24-Jun-11    40 
because the penalty rate is now independent of the investment decision, which is not the case for the 
auction price estimation. The individual-level data from sub-period one are used in the estimation. We 
employ panel data probit and logit estimation models because the investment decision is a binary 
choice. The regression summary is shown in Table 13. 
The first four models are estimated using a probit model, and the results are consistent across all four. 
Model 1 is run using cluster-robust standard error OLS estimators. Models 2 to 4 are based on a 
robust random-effects probit model with bootstrapped estimates. A logit model similar to Model 4 is 
run in Model 5. Due to the nature of binary choice models, the interpretation of the estimation results 
is not straightforward in terms of magnitude. Nevertheless, the sign of the estimates indicates the 
effect of the regressors on the dependant variable. 
The estimates reveal that different penalty types provide different incentives with regard to investment 
decisions. The FPR treatment has a negative but trivial effect on investment. In contrast, the MGP 
treatment  has  a  significantly  positive  effect  on  investment.  These  findings  are  very  reasonable, 
because firms might have a lower marginal financial penalty in the FPR treatment than in the highly 
punitive MGP treatment. The effect of the penalty rate is almost negligible, but positive as expected. 
On the contrary, a high MGP level has a negative effect on investment decisions, even though it is not 
statistically significant. However, the regression models can better explain the effect of the MGP 
treatment because they control for other factors that might influence investment decisions. 
According to the experimental design, high MAC firms should not invest and choose to comply by 
buying permits. The regression models confirm the theory as this variable has a negative sign and is 
highly significant. A similar effect is also produced by firm permit position. When firms learn that 
they have an excess of permits, they do not invest. In this sense, the firms show rational investment 
behaviour. 
The auction price has a crucial effect on firm investment behaviour. Conversely, trading prices have 
essentially no effect on investment decisions. This proves that the main price signal for compliance 
strategy is determined at the auction as the primary market rather than in the secondary market. 
We find that learning does not have an effect on investment decisions as indicated by the estimate for 
round. The additional risk-related variables in Model 4 and Model 5 are also not significant. Other 
demographic variables such as the subject‟s gender and age are also tested as regressors, but the 
results show that they are insignificant. 
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Dummy for FPR  -0.045  -0.0746  -0.0713  -0.0515  -0.0534 
(0.2573)  (0.2573)  (0.2579)  (0.2767)  (0.5008) 
Penalty rate  0.0023  0.0031  0.0032  0.003  0.0064 
(0.0026)  (0.0029)  (0.0029)  (0.0031)  (0.0056) 
Dummy for MGP  0.5013*  0.5857**  0.5871**  0.5832**  1.0922** 
(0.197)  (0.2037)  (0.2033)  -0.1949  (0.3596) 
Dummy for high-level 
MGP  
-0.3369  -0.3787  -0.3755  -0.3455  -0.5245 
(0.1775)  (0.2152)  (0.2137)  (0.1765)  (0.34) 
High MAC firm  -0.8266***  -0.9084***  -0.9067***  -0.8914***  -1.6401*** 
(0.097)  (0.1296)  (0.1316)  (0.1347)  (0.2509) 
Auction price  0.0121***  0.0142***  0.0132***  0.0138***  0.0247*** 
(0.0034)  (0.0032)  (0.0033)  (0.0036)  (0.0063) 
Mean trading price  0.0000  -0.0002  -0.0002  0.0000  0.0000 
(0.0014)  (0.0019)  (0.0019)  (0.0019)  (0.0036) 
Permit surplus  -0.1191***  -0.1393***  -0.1394***  -0.1406***  -0.2623*** 
(0.008)  (0.0113)  (0.0114)  (0.0102)  (0.0194) 
Round      -0.0179     
    (0.0396)     
Group risk preference 
index  
      0.0065   
      (0.0467)   
Subjects with 
inconsistent risk choices 
      0.3338   
      (0.1798)   
_cons  -1.0329***  -1.2810***  -1.1820***  -1.3977***  -2.5122*** 
  (0.3073)  (0.2813)  (0.3538)  (0.3478)  (0.5691) 
No. obs.  1440  1440  1440  1440  1440 
No. subjects  240  240  240  240  240 
Log likelihood  -448.63  -431.01  -430.859  -429.065  -422.93 
R
2  0.5433         
Wald chi
2  303.1957  227.3476  221.2588  285.8775  229.7005 
% Correctly predicted  88.75         
 Notes:   The numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of the estimates. 
           * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level, *** significant at 0.1% level 
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The  statistics  of  the  models  show  that  the  addition  of  more  explanatory  variables  does  not 
substantially increase the goodness of fit of the model. Overall, the models have considerably high 
predictive power (88.75%), as shown by the basic model (Model 1).  
To sum up, the investment decision is influenced by price signals at the auction, firm type (high or 
low MAC firm), and permit holding position toward compliance. Furthermore, MGP as a penalty type 
provides significantly stronger investment incentives compared to other penalty designs. 
7.3.  Compliance Decisions through Permit-Buying 
Since an investment decision automatically ensures firm compliance, this section discusses estimation 
models  for  compliance  only  through  permit-buying.  Therefore,  only  observations  associated  with 
those subjects who do not make investment decisions are used in the regression. Considering that 
compliance status is a binary variable, the regressions are performed using probit and logit estimators 
for random effect panel data.  
With regard to penalty design, the summary of estimates in Table 14 shows results similar to those of 
the investment decision model. Subjects tend to be more non-compliant in the FPR treatment than in 
the MGP treatment. Nevertheless, unlike in the investment model, the penalty rate provides a highly 
significant compliance incentive for permit buyers. This finding is in line with Result 2, in which the 
compliance rate is higher when the penalty level is higher in the FPR treatment. 
The MGP treatment generates the highest marginal effect on compliance, and this effect is also highly 
significant. A higher make-good ratio also increases the likelihood of subject‟s compliance although 
this effect is statistically not different to zero. The test statistics of the models validate Result 3 in 
which the penalty level in the MGP treatment has no effect on compliance rates.  
There is evidence of learning over time as the coefficient of round is statistically significant across 
models.  The  opposite  effect  is  observed  with  the  variable  sub-period  two.  In  line  with  the 
experimental design, the estimates reveal that subjects find it more difficult to be compliant only 
through  permit-buying,  particularly  in  sub-period  two.  This  effect  is  undoubtedly  true  in  MGP 
treatments in which even slight non-compliance by the end of sub-period one can put very high 
pressure on permit demand in sub-period two. Knowing that permit buyers will attempt to avoid 
penalties in the second sub-period, permit sellers have the advantage of selling the permit at a much 
higher price than the theoretical equilibrium. Nevertheless, the effect is statistically not different from 
zero. 
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Table 14 Estimates Summary for Compliance Decisions 
Regressors for 
compliance decisions 











Dummy for FPR  -0.0872  -0.1416  -0.1397  -0.142  -0.2593 
(0.1653)  (0.1911)  (0.2206)  (0.2189)  (0.3500) 
Penalty rate  0.0087***  0.0089**  0.0088***  0.0089***  0.0152*** 
(0.0021)  (0.0028)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0046) 
Dummy for MGP  0.9548***  0.9796***  0.9776***  1.0025***  1.6834*** 
(0.2019)  (0.2354)  (0.2383)  (0.2298)  (0.4696) 
Dummy for high level 
MGP  
0.0779  0.1307  0.1306  0.1235  0.1954 
(0.1801)  (0.1870)  (0.1796)  (0.2176)  (0.3814) 
Round 
0.051  0.0749*  0.0750*  0.0727*    0.1263*   
(0.0291)  (0.0334)  (0.0331)  (0.034)  (0.0514) 
Auction Price 
-0.0088***  -0.0103***  -0.0102***  -0.0086**   -0.0175*** 
(0.0025)  (0.0028)  (0.0026)  (0.0029)  (0.0043) 
Dummy for sub-
period two 
      -0.0094    -0.0225 
      (0.0762)    (0.1396) 
Mean trading price 
      -0.0031   
      (0.0018)   
_cons 
0.0802  0.1508  0.1559  0.1912  0.2811 
(0.2639)  (0.3028)  (0.2984)  (0.3093)  (0.5910) 
N  1114  1114  1114    1114 
Log likelihood  -592.4348  -572.8482  -572.8431  -570.8979  -572.347 
R
2  0.0632  0.0461^  0.0461^  0.0493^  0.0456^ 
Chi2  41.7655  45.5528  62.4192  62.1237  60.0678 
% correctly predicted  74.78         
Notes: The numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of the estimates. 
^ indicates estimated R
2 = (log likelihood – constant-only log likelihood) / constant-only log likelihood 
  * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level, *** significant at 0.1% level 
It is not surprising that auction prices generate a negative effect on compliance incentive, because 
higher permit prices increase compliance costs, causing the marginal benefit of being non-compliant 
to increase accordingly. This effect is highly significant, although it is much smaller in magnitude 
than the influence of the MGP treatment. The trading price also has a negative effect on compliance, 
but the magnitude of the effect is only half that of the auction price and is not statistically significant. 
It is important to point out that the coefficients on auction price and penalty rates counterbalance each 
other. Across models, we can see that their magnitudes are not very different. In all models except for 
Model 4, the marginal effect of the penalty rate is smaller than that of the auction price. In Model 4, 
the inclusion of the mean trading price moderates the marginal effect of the auction price.   24-Jun-11    44 
The estimates are fairly consistent across models in terms of the sign of the coefficients. Statistically, 
the random effects binary choice models yield more consistent estimates than the OLS estimator. The 
OLS  model  shows  that the  model  has  fairly  good  predictive  power  with  about  75%  of  the  data 
correctly predicted. However, the value of R
2 is relatively small and slightly reduced in the random 
effect models. 
Overall, the compliance decisions of net buyers are influenced by penalty designs (the level of penalty 
rate and the MGP penalty) and auction price. The adverse effect of  a high auction price on  the 
compliance decision surpasses the positive incentives given by penalty rates. The estimates explain 
the incidence of lower compliance rates in the FPR compared to the MGP and the mixed penalty 
treatment. Over time, subjects learn to make better compliance decisions. 
7.4.  Efficiency 
Regression  models  for  efficiency  are  performed  using  Tobit  estimators  because  the  range  of  the 
possible values is truncated. As previously explained, efficiency is measured in terms of the actual 
group earnings compared to the theoretical optimum. Interestingly, we find some observations in 
which  the  efficiency  level  is  higher  than  one,  due  to  the  auction  price  being  below  the  optimal 
equilibrium.  Those  observations  are  mostly  associated  with  the  MGP  treatment.  There  are  some 
reasons why this might have happened. First, a low auction price might occur due to over investment, 
which would naturally lower permit demand. Furthermore, some subjects who have decided to make 
investment simply do not actively participate at the auction by submitting zero bidding quantity even 
at a low bidding price because they feel that they have chosen their best compliance strategy and 
hence are not interested in the outcome of the auction market. Low prices also emerge in sub-period 
one of the MGP treatment, in which the financial penalty for non-compliance is zero. Thus, zero 
compliance cost does not provide an incentive for the subjects to actively participate in the auction. 
Therefore, we only use left censoring at zero in the estimation models. Group-level data is used to 
estimate the models because we would like to assess market-level efficiency instead of individual-
level efficiency. 
The estimation results are fairly similar across models (Table 15). The first model is performed with 
cluster-robust standard error estimators and with each observation group as the cluster identity. The 
penalty  design  treatment  variable,  price  variables,  and  time  variables  are  used  as  explanatory 
variables. Surprisingly, the dummy for the FPR treatment and the penalty rate have almost negligible 
effects on efficiency. As in the previous estimation models, the MGP treatment and auction price are 
highly significant in both economic and statistical terms.  
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Table 15 Estimates Summary for Efficiency 
Regressor for efficiency  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Tobit  Panel data Tobit  Panel data Tobit 
Dummy for FPR  -0.0003  -0.0024  0.0094 
(0.0231)  (0.0297)  (0.0117) 
Penalty rate  0.0000  0.0001  -0.0004**  
(0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0001) 
Dummy for MGP  -0.0437**  -0.0395*  -0.0786*** 
(0.0156)  (0.0184)  (0.0127) 
Dummy for high-level MGP   0.0153  0.0154  -0.0058 
(0.0199)  (0.0232)  (0.0111) 
Auction Price  -0.0059***  -0.0059***  -0.0055*** 
(0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0002) 
Mean trading price  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0001 
(0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0001) 
Round  0.0062**  0.0061*  0.0003 
(0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0021) 
Dummy for sub-period two  -0.0697***  -0.0690***  -0.0678*** 
(0.0113)  (0.0103)  (0.0071) 
Compliance rate      0.5168*** 
    (0.0373) 
Investment level      -0.2020*** 
    (0.0166) 
_cons  1.1733***  1.1709***  0.9885*** 
(-0.0324)  (0.0313)  (0.0324) 
N  360  360  360 
Log likelihood  383.5838  385.8185  470.3238 
Chi2  180.0935  492.9965  1445.322 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses represent the standard errors of the estimates. 
^ indicates estimated R
2 = (log likelihood – constant-only log likelihood) / constant-only log likelihood 
  * significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% level, *** significant at 0.1% level 
The  existence  of  a  learning  effect  is  also  confirmed  because  the  coefficient  of  round  is  highly 
significant. This indicates that, over time, subjects learn to make better decisions in the game that 
contribute to higher efficiency in the market.  The coefficient on sub-period two has a negative sign, 
indicating  that  efficiency  in  this  sub-period  tends  to  be  lower  than  in  sub-period  one.  The  high 
financial penalty in the second sub-period for MGP treatment might be the underlying reason for this 
effect. Otherwise, it seems that investing firms attempt to make a profit selling in sub-period two by 
buying more permits at the auction. Nevertheless, this attempt does not seem to be successful; the 
mean trading prices are lower than the auction price 70% of the time. Hence, efficiency is reduced for 
both buyers who cannot obtain the required permits and sellers who cannot achieve their preferred 
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Model 2 is very similar to Model 1, except for the fact that the regression is run with a panel data 
Tobit estimator. The estimation results are not very different, but the goodness of fit of the model is 
increased as shown by the value of the log likelihood. 
The inclusion of the investment level and compliance rates variables in Model 3 changes the model 
estimates considerably. The sign of the FPR treatment is now positive, although it is not statistically 
significant. The penalty rate, on the other hand, becomes highly significant. This is reasonable as 
higher penalty rates are related to higher costs when non-compliance occurs. Similarly, the effect of 
the MGP treatment is almost doubled in this model, while the  effect of high MGP levels is not 
significant. It can be inferred that the MGP penalty type and the level of the penalty rate are the main 
determinants of efficiency. 
The important finding that we obtain from this model is that the investment levels and compliance 
rates have the opposite effect on efficiency.  Higher compliance levels in the market contribute to 
greater efficiency. On the contrary, higher investment levels will reduce efficiency, due to higher 
investment costs than necessary. As seen in Figure 6, it is also clear that some high MAC firms decide 
to make investment decisions that entail higher total investment costs than are optimal in the market. 
Furthermore, over-investment prevails in the market and exacerbates inefficiency. 
8. Discussion 
In line with the theory, our results show that different penalty designs do not necessarily indicate 
different permit prices. We find that auction prices do not significantly vary across treatments, as 
shown by Result 1 and the regression models for auction price. The important determinants of auction 
price are the subject‟s risk attitude and rational thinking ability. This finding will have an important 
implication on the design of trading schemes in practice in which there is a tendency that auctions will 
increasingly be used as the initial allocation mechanism. Despite the advantages of having a system 
with auctioned permits, it is important to ensure that the extent of speculative or strategic bidding 
behaviour  can  be  moderated  with  an  appropriate  auction  design.  Some  studies  have  shown  that 
reducing uncertainties regarding the expected permit price might be the key to address the problem. 
Result 2 of this experiment has shown that, contrary to the theory that predicts that there will be no 
difference in compliance rates as long as the penalty level is set above the equilibrium permit price, 
significantly  higher  compliance  levels  emerge  with  the  high  level  FPR.  This  study  reveals  that 
subjects learn about different maximum compliance costs related to high penalty rates, which in turn 
affects their compliance strategy. However, high penalty rates do not provide a different incentive 
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In contrast, Result 3 confirms the theory that high penalty levels (make-good ratios) in the make-good 
provision penalty type do not produce different investment levels and compliance rates. It is believed 
that the feature of our experimental design ,which forces compliance by imposing huge financial 
penalty at the end of the second sub-period, affect the result. This provision leaves little room for 
subjects to be more speculative unlike in the FPR penalty type. 
Result 4 indicates that when a comparison is drawn across penalty types with similar penalty levels, 
different compliance rates are only confirmed for low level penalty treatment. In this case, the MGP 
treatment provides a stronger compliance incentive than the FPR treatment even though the make-
good ratio is slightly lower (a restoration rate of unity) than the penalty rate factor (1.2 of equilibrium 
price).  
The statistics of the estimation models for compliance decision verify Result 2 and Result 4 as both 
the penalty rates and the MGP treatment are the significant penalty design variables. 
With regard to the Mixed Penalty design, Result 5 reveals that this double penalty encourages higher 
investment  levels  and  compliance  rates  compared  to  the  baseline  low  level  FPR  treatment. 
Nevertheless, the regression models prove that the MGP treatment is the only significant penalty 
design  variable  that  affects  investment  decisions.  The  models  also  verify  that  subjects  behave 
rationally in making their investment decisions. 
A trade-off between efficiency and compliance is revealed as the regression models show that the 
MGP treatment has both statistically and economically significant effects on efficiency. Hence, the 
penalty design that encourages higher compliance levels might encourage lower efficiency levels 
when over-investment occurs in the market. As auction price plays a significant role in investment 
decisions, the presence of risk aversion might in practice indirectly contribute to this over-investment, 
leading to inefficiency in the market. 
It is important to point out that our experimental design does not take into account banking of permits, 
which is allowed in almost all existing trading schemes. The presence of banking might smooth out 
the  uncertainties  regarding  the  permit  price  and  thus  facilitates  better  price  discovery  and  a 
convergence path of the permit price. Nevertheless, another experiment also shows that this provision 
might have an adverse effect on the compliance rate and emissions level due to the perceived benefit 
of underreporting under the condition of imperfect enforcement, in which the audit probability is less 
than one (Cason and Gangadharan, 2006).  
Another  feature  that  might  change  compliance  incentives  under  different  penalty  designs  is  the 
presence of a discount rate and the use of longer sub-periods to allow its effect to take place. The 
presence of a discount rate will reduce future costs, and when the costs and emissions cap in the   24-Jun-11    48 
trading  scheme  are  stationary  over  time,  firms  might  delay  investment  and  shift  their  emissions 
towards the present, as pointed out by Kling and Rubin (1997). Therefore, it will be interesting to see 
the choice of firms‟ compliance strategies when the restoration rate is set equal to the discount rate to 
counterbalance the effect of decreasing costs due to the discount rate. Furthermore, longer compliance 
periods will also enhance the irreversible nature of investment in our model, in which risk preference 
might play a more important role in this case. 
Finally, the use of a different auction design might reduce the inefficiency due to overbidding. Sealed-
bid auctions have been recommended as a format that might facilitate bidding behaviour closer to 
bidders‟ private valuations. The downside of this auction format is that inexperienced bidders do not 
have an opportunity to revise their bids and there is a potential of having a winner‟s curse problem. 
An alternative format that might enhance efficiency is the use of an Anglo-Dutch format as suggested 
by Klemperer (2002). In this format, an auction is first run with an ascending clock auction until two 
bidders, or a few subjects in this case, are left. The auction is then continued using a sealed-bid 
format.  
9. Conclusion 
Although the importance of penalty design as an enforcement tool has been widely recognised in 
practice, the assessment of its efficacy on compliance rates in particular and market performance in 
general  is  difficult  to  make  due  to  the  unfeasibility  of  comparing  existing  trading  schemes  with 
different  market  structures  and  design  features.  A  laboratory  experiment  offers  the  advantage  of 
providing insight by isolating the effect of the penalty design in question as the market design features 
are held under control. 
Our findings reveal that under the presence of subjects‟ risk preferences and some degree of permit 
price uncertainty, penalty levels provide an indication of total costs of compliance. This, in turn, affect 
firms‟ choice of compliance strategies as well as the compliance rate, although it does not influence 
the price discovery process. Surprisingly, risk preference does not have a direct role in influencing 
subjects‟  compliance  decision.  Nevertheless,  it  affects  the  permit  price,  which  evidently  is  a 
significant determinant of compliance decisions and efficiency. 
The make-good provision evidently induces higher investment and compliance levels than the fixed 
penalty rate does. It is important to point out that there is a trade-off between higher investment levels 
and efficiency because the penalty design that encourages higher investment levels for compliance 
purposes also corresponds to an adverse effect on efficiency. The inefficiency attributed to penalty 
design has not received sufficient attention, as the focus has been placed on compliance. These trade-  24-Jun-11    49 
offs  should  be  considered  before  a policy  is implemented;  otherwise,  the  efficiency  of  a  trading 
scheme will be compromised. 
In practice, the mixed penalty design is widely used in order to encourage higher compliance rates. 
The findings from our laboratory experiment support that view, as the presence of a FPR element and 
a MGP element induce higher compliance rates. Nevertheless, only the MGP element in the mixed 
penalty provides higher investment incentives at the expense of lower efficiency levels.  
The main findings from this experiment are summarised as follows. 
Table 16 A Summary of the Main Findings of the Penalty Design Experiment 
No.  Main Findings  Supports 
1.  Penalty design does not affect permit price  Result 1 and regression models  
for auction price 
2.  Higher compliance rates are found with higher penalty 
levels in the FPR penalty, but not in the MGP penalty 
Result 2 and Result 3 
3  MGP penalty type induces higher investment 
incentives than the FPR  
Result 4 and regression models 
for investment decision 
4  The mixed penalty design provides higher investment 
and compliance incentives relative to the low FPR 
penalty. 
Result 5 
5  There is a trade-off between investment incentives and 
efficiency levels as the MGP penalty corresponds to a 
lower efficiency level and a higher investment level. 
Regression models for 
efficiency 
The mixed penalty design in this study also shed some light on the effects of tying the penalty rate to 
the auction price as proposed by the Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme. We do not find 
the occurrence of bid shedding at the auction, and both investment levels and compliance rates remain 
relatively higher compared to other penalty designs. It is only the MGP element of the double penalty, 
rather than the two penalty types (the FPR and the MGP element), that contributes to lower efficiency 
levels. With the presence of a reserve price at the auction, the proposed Australian model seems to 
serve its purpose of providing strong compliance incentives. 
Overall, we believe that the experiment has provided valuable insights into how a specific penalty 
design can have an impact not only on compliance rates but also on market efficiency. Furthermore, a 
laboratory experiment can serve as a test-bed for policy makers to test how well the proposed design 
features of a trading scheme might work.   24-Jun-11    50 
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